Each quarter, Travel + Leisure Co. worked out how many of its customers’ defaulted loans it would need to cancel in order to hit the guidance it had already given the stock market. That is the allegation at the centre of a case the Securities and Exchange Commission settled on September 30, 2026 with the largest timeshare company in the world. Between May 2019 and at least December 2020 it ran two internal projects that rescinded more than 2,900 delinquent or defaulted customer loans, worth about $77 million in balances and including roughly $34 million already in default, refunding the customers and removing the loans from its books. The credit metrics investors watch duly improved. Nobody outside the company was told the projects existed.
The settled action, filed in the Southern District of Florida and issued as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 4603, resolves on a neither admit nor deny basis. Travel + Leisure will pay a civil penalty of $975,000 for what the settlement characterises as non-scienter-based violations, meaning negligence rather than intentional deception. The company had already disclosed an agreement in principle with SEC staff in its annual report filed in February 2026.
A Quarterly Target for Cancelling Bad Loans
The first programme, the Special Handling Project, began in May 2019. The detail that defines the case is how it was run. According to the SEC, Travel + Leisure set internal targets for the number of delinquent and defaulted loans it needed to rescind in order to meet the publicly disclosed guidance it had given for its loan loss provision percentage.
That inverts the ordinary relationship between a business and the figure it reports. The metric is meant to describe the portfolio. Here the portfolio was being adjusted by a planned quantity so the metric would land where the company had told the market it would.
Bulk Rescissions With No Individual Review
The second programme, the Past-Due Project, began in August 2019 and worked differently. The company compiled spreadsheets of delinquent and defaulted loans linked to customer complaints and rescinded them in bulk, without individual review by its Sales Reversal Committee, the body that normally considered rescission requests arriving after the statutory window closed.
Both projects reached loans the company had previously declined to rescind, either because the complaint did not justify it or because the statutory period had long expired. Consumers typically get five to seven days to rescind under state law. Every loan cancelled under these projects fell outside that, and most were months or years old. Once coded for rescission, the customer’s payments were refunded, collection stopped, and for deeded contracts the customer was asked to return the deed. In the accounting system the contract was reversed as if the loan had never been made, which meant undoing the original revenue too.
Forecast but Not Tracked
One further detail sharpens the disclosure point. The SEC says Travel + Leisure forecast the anticipated impact of rescinding past due loans on its loan loss provision percentage and on defaults, but did not track what the projects actually did to its financial statements.
The company modelled the effect in advance, which is how it knew what the programmes were worth, and then did not measure the result. That is an awkward combination for any argument that the improvement was incidental.
A Penalty Worth One Percent of the Loans
The settlement figure deserves a moment. Travel + Leisure removed about $77 million of bad loans from its portfolio over roughly eighteen months and reported improved credit metrics as a result. It will pay $975,000, which is a little over one percent of those balances and under three percent of the $34 million that was already in default.
The negligence framing explains much of that. The SEC did not allege the company set out to deceive anyone, and a non-scienter case carries lower penalties than a fraud case. The accrual in the company’s own accounts was $3 million as of June 2026, so the outcome landed below what it had reserved.
The Omission Is the Charge
Nothing here says the rescissions were wrong. Letting a defaulting customer out of a timeshare may be sound business and fair treatment. What the complaint identifies is narrower: an investor watching that percentage improve would reasonably read it as better underwriting or stronger sales, when a material part of it came from thousands of bad loans being cancelled under two programmes nobody outside the company knew about.
Disclosure rules reach the reasons behind a number, not just the number. The figures were accurate. The picture they created was not.
Conclusion
The world’s largest timeshare company set internal targets for how many defaulted customer loans to cancel each period so a published metric would stay inside the guidance it had given the market. It cancelled more than 2,900 of them, about $77 million in balances, reaching loans it had previously refused to rescind and loans years past the statutory window, some in bulk with no individual review. It forecast what this would do to its numbers and never measured what it did. Then it reported the improvement for sixteen months without mentioning any of it. It will pay $975,000 and admit nothing.
